The FTC’sreported closing of its Google search prejudice investigation , with no real enforceable colonisation mechanics , and a especial new ego - enforcement antimonopoly case law plain only available to Google , kindle serious enquiry about the integrity of the FTC ’s law enforcement process and whether the FTC accords Google with exceptional treatment not available to other companies .
https://gizmodo.com/the-us-government-slaps-google-again-but-spares-it-micr-5972859
Why did n’t the FTC treat Google like they treated Microsoft in the 90s , even while they have been doing the same and even worse things ? Why did they flatten their probe when faculty and State Attorneys General recommend pursuance and the European Union is prosecute Google ? Scott Cleland has some head that perhaps you may want to ask your representative . Disclaimer : Scott Cleland isnot a 100 - percent objective critic of Google . That said , we think his popular opinion is still valid . — Ed
This issue raisesmanymoretroubling question than the top ten unanswered questions raised in this patch , but these motion zero in on many of the most glaringirregularities for Congressional superintendent , the culture medium and governing watchdogs to follow up on .
1 . Why does the FTC consider that they can trust Google to faithfully ego - enforce : when Google violated the FTC’sGoogle - Buzzenforceable privacyconsent decreein just eight months with theGoogle Safari hack ; and when Google mischievously hoodwinked the FTC withvoluntary promisestoprematurely shut downits Google Street View WiFi probe , when theFCC ’s investigationsubsequently concluded that Google systematically misrepresented its Street View WiFi actions to the public and the FTC , and “ deliberately impeded and check ” the FCC ’s investigation ?
https://gizmodo.com/f-ck-you-google-5470696
2 . Why is the FTC give Google a particular voluntary ego - enforcement standard under Section 5 , when itsued Intelunder its incision 5 office and demand an enforceableconsent decreeafter a similar long investigation and a likewise strong staff recommendation for prosecution ?
3 . Why does Google warrant a especial self - enforcement standard , when Google possess thesingle worst antitrustandprivacy recordof any major U.S. tummy ; has well - found trackrecords of misrepresentationandobstruction of justice ; and owns an unabashedculture of unaccountability ? ( Is the FTC set a reprobate new precedent that the spoiled antitrust habitual criminal warrants the most indulgence from prosecution — immediately contradict the Administration ’s hope of strong antimonopoly enforcement ? )
4 . How does it protect American consumers from misleading exercise for the FTC to rush to close down its 20 - month - long Google search preconception investigation , when waiting just a few week longer , would let the FTC learn what enforceable consumer protections Google will bid European - consumer for misleadingly biasing search results ? ( And why is n’t this patently substantial selective information critical to keep the wholeness of the FTC ’s investigation and its law of nature enforcement process ? )
5 . How can FTC Commissioners accurately claim there is insufficient evidence to prosecute Google , when they are fully cognizant that the FTC has not seek to test the potentially most criminatory grounds provingGoogle anti - competitive hunting biasintent identify by the Texas Attorney General ? ( How does it move on the wholeness of their legal philosophy enforcement unconscious process for the FTC to blatantly look the other path on this ? )
6 . Why are FTC Commissioners apparently go out of their way to orchestrate protection of Google from the prosecution and accountability , when their staffinvestigators recommend pursuance , the FTC Chairman repeatedly threatened prosecution , State Attorneys General recommend prosecution , and theEU authorities are prosecute Google ? ( How does closing down the investigation well service consumer protection stake here than keeping it open ? )
7 . If assure 240 million American consumers indifferent hunt when routinely and opaquely providing them with biased lookup is not a deceptive occupation exercise , what is ? ( Is the FTC pose a new case law here that misrepresentation in reality can be final - goodness for consumer if accompanied with enough ancillary innovation and consumer benefits ? )
8 . Why did the FTC obviously conclude it could not engage Google under Section 5 when the FTC : recently did with Intel ; argue the FTC was intimately befit to investigate Google because of Section 5 ; the FTCsignaled its investigationfound Google Section 5 infringement ; and the FTC has found Google hasviolated Section 5 on privacy twice ?
9 . In the mellow visibility antimonopoly investigation of the 21st century , how many times did the FTC Commissioners meet publicly and/or in closed academic session to discuss this significant Google antitrust investigating ? ( Under the Sunshine Act , no more than two FTC commissioners may meet together in private , unless the topic of the private matter is in public reported . It appear from the FTC ’s public record , ( if they are exact ) that the full FTC has not met either publically or in shut session to discuss , debate or further look into the meritoriousness and strengths of the FTC staff ’s recommendation to prosecute Google for search bias . If the full commision did not meet together to talk about the Google instance , like it has in antitrust cases affect other company under antitrust investigation , this would add yet another FTC special Google treatment irregularity to the many document hereand before . Why would Google warrant such special beneficial outgrowth treatment from the FTC ? )
10 . Why have DOJ - Google antimonopoly investigation bear a 4 - 0 record of successful antitrust enforcement action or enforceable settlement , and the FTC - Google antitrust investigation have yielded an 0 - 3 phonograph recording of no successful antitrust enforcement natural process or enforceable settlement ? ( DOJ:2008,2010,2011 , & 2011 ; FTC:2007,2010 ; & 2013 . )
These core questions strongly evoke that the Google hunt prejudice problem will not go aside — as much as Google and the FTC apparently require them to — and will retain to dog Google and the FTC until suitably and fairly answer by the overall law enforcement process .
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